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Policy Considerations in Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition
Joseph Dainow*
The problem of the so-called migratory divorce has existed
for a very long time in the United States, but has become more
and more serious and aggravated as a result of the bargain count-
er divorce mills which have been operating for local profit in a
few states. To some extent, the migratory divorce is inevitable
in the American constitutional system under which each state
has almost complete sovereignty in the field of private law; as
long as there is a fairly common basis and general uniformity of
social policies (and, possibly, also a consideration for national
interests), there is no serious problem about migratory divorce.
However, for a long time the Supreme Court of the United States
has felt that certain individual states were placing their selfish
profit interest so far out of proportion to the national interests
that federal policy interference was both warranted and justified.
In a variety of situations the Court has taken the position
that when there arises a conflict between the interest of one
state and the interest of another state, or a conflict between the
interest of one state and the general interest of all the states, it
raises a question which is properly one for examination and de-
termination by the Supreme Court of the United States. It was
on this basis that the Court led up to the unexpected decision
in Haddock v. Haddock,' which came in 1906 as a shock and a
surprise to the legal profession.
There always were, and will continue to be, the conflicting
objectives in connection with the migratory divorce problem. On
the one hand, the local jurisdiction of each state in the matter
of divorce and the need to permit a person to obtain a divorce
in the place where he is established; on the other hand, the need
for stability and certainty in the status of people who have once
been married so that the same person should not be treated as
married in one state but unmarried in another state (as well as
all the further incidents of this kind of situation). Similarly,
two conflicting policies have been motivating the United States
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867 (1906).
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Supreme Court: one policy aiming to discourage the migratory
divorce altogether; another policy seeking to maintain uniform-
ity of status.
To discourage migratory divorce, thereby precluding so
many of the problems regarding uniformity, without interfering
with the local jurisdiction of the states, seems to have been the
combination of policy considerations which moved the Supreme
Court of the United States to render the Haddock decision and
enter the policy field on this question. They used the "full faith
and credit" clause of the Constitution, in an effort to discourage
the seeking of a divorce in a state which was the domicile of one
spouse with no other jurisdictional contact, hoping that the threat
of withholding compulsory recognition in another state would be
a sufficient deterrent to discourage migratory divorce.
The failure of this policy to accomplish the desired objective
was evident long before the Supreme Court made the admission
in the Williams cases. 2 However, while admitting the failure of its
Haddock policy, it still held on to the "full faith and credit" device
to support the shift in its position-giving up to some extent
the objective of discouraging the migratory divorce and accepting
with resignation the position which makes at least for more uni-
formity of status.
Meanwhile, the Court had already started to develop the
policy of emphasizing uniformity (rather than discouragement)
by means of the "res adjudicata" device in the Davis case.3 From
this and similar decisions, 4 it was but one big step further to hand
down the decisions in the Sherrer5 and Coe6 cases, which might
be taken to indicate a position of retaining at least the policy of
uniformity even if the policy of discouragement has failed.
However, it can hardly be said that the Supreme Court has
given up completely the Haddock general policy (of discourage-
ment) in favor of the Williams and Sherrer policy (of uniformity)
by reason of a changed opinion of the basic question. In view of
the continuous attempts of the Supreme Court to establish na-
tional standards in certain areas of family relations, and in view
of the almost universal complaints about the evil effects of migra-
2. Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279(1942); Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.
1577 (1945).
3. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26, 118 A.L.R. 1518
(1938).
4. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85
(1939).
5. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948).
6. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 S.Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. 1451 (1948).
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tory divorce, it is not stretching the point to say that the earlier
policy of discouraging migratory divorce would still be preferred
over the narrower policy of uniformity. The latter encourages the
easy divorces by stabilizing the status of the individuals affected
thereby. The inability to achieve full results on both scores (dis-
couragement and uniformity) does not necessarily resolve itself
into an acceptance of the lesser of the two objectives.
If there is a generally desired policy of discouragement and
stabilization, and if the Supreme Court's activity in this field is
appropriate, then careful examination might be made of the possi-
bility of using the "due process" clause of the Constitution to ac-
complish the purpose. It is conceded that the "full faith and
credit" clause, in the way that it was applied, has not succeeded.
It has been recognized almost universally, and newly asserted
in the Rice case 7 by the Supreme Court of the United States, that
the only proper basis for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction is the
domicile of at least one spouse. Under ordinary circumstances it
would not be necessary to qualify the word "domicile" as mean-
ing bona fde domicile; however, it can be very important in the
present connection.
In the long-standing case of Pennoyer v. Neff,8 the Supreme
Court established the due process device to protect non-residents
from an improper exercise of authority by the courts of one state.
A state statute conferring jurisdiction upon its courts was un-
availing to create jurisdiction where none existed, and that kind
of a judgment was therefore null and void, even in the state
which rendered it.
If bona fide domicile of the plaintiff spouse is considered a
minimum jurisdictional fact for the entertaining of a divorce suit
against the nonresident defendant, in accordance with the Wil-
liams cases and the Rice case, then the divorce rendered in a state
which is not the bona fide domicile of one spouse might be con-
sidered null and void as violative of due process. The fact that a
local statute purports to confer jurisdiction on the basis of a few
weeks residence would then be unavailing to give even local
validity to a judgment rendered in violation of this interpretation
of the due process clause. 9
When the selfish interests of a few divorce-mill states conflict
so seriously with the general governmental interests of so many
7. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 69 S.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 770 (1949).
8. 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).
9. There would still be the problem of estoppel against the defendant
who made a general appearance.
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other states, as well as with the general welfare of the whole
country, it must needs be a proper subject for the Supreme
Court's examination and determination. The Court's latest decis-
ion in the Rice case picks up where the Williams cases left off, and
now brings in the emphasis on "bona fide domicile" for full faith
and credit purposes. With the further development of this concept
as a necessary jurisdictional fact, the Court might consider the
res adjudicata idea of the Sherrer and Coe cases as yielding to the
still later developments on the essentials for jurisdiction-just as
the Andrews case10 yielded to subsequent collateral developments
of the law on finality of jurisdictional findings.1 The jurisdic-
tional fact of bona fide domicile might thus become a requirement
for due process in a divorce suit against a nonresident spouse who
could allege deprivation of his or her rights by reason of the
forced change in marital status (personal, financial, social, and so
forth). Further, and in due time, children and other third persons
could complain about the deprivation of their property rights.
Thus, if a court in State F-2 denied recognition to a divorce
rendered in State F-1 on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking
because there was no bona fide domicile, or conversely, if the
court in State F-2 did recognize the decree of F-1 whose jurisdic-
tion was predicated upon a questionable domicile, the matter
would 'then have to be taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States on the issue of bona fide domicile. There are certain undis-
puted minimum and universal tests of domicile which would be
utilized by the Court as a starting point, and in its decisions it
could develop a pattern of standards for domicile which would
necessarily have to be observed by the state courts in their sub-
sequent treatment of such problems. This would not be unlike
the way in which the Supreme Court has established standards
for the determination of questions (for example, what constitutes
"doing business") under the due process clause regarding juris-
diction over nonresidents in a variety of other kinds of cases.
Proposals for the better stabilization of the institution of
marriage and the discouragement of easy divorce have ranged
over a wide variety of devices, from federal legislation fixing
universal bases for divorce jurisdiction in all states, to interna-
tional treaties establishing bases for reciprocal recognition of
foreign-country divorces. The possibility of uniform legislation
being adopted in all the states is out of the question by reason of
10. 188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1902).
11. In the case of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 353, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1902,
92 L.Ed. 1429, 1437 (1948).
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the selfish and inconsiderate attitude of some few states. Accord-
ingly, federal action, legislative or judicial, is the only possible
means for achieving adequate results; and the realistic chance of
such federal legislation at the present time is just about nil.
There remains only the realm of federal judicial action, and here
it must be recognized that the way in which the Supreme Court
used the full faith and credit clause has resulted in an admitted
failure.12 Their manipulation of the res adjudicata device indi-
cates their continued interest in this field but seems to be headed
in the wrong direction.
The due process device has proved satisfactory in a wide
range of problems concerning jurisdiction over nonresidents in
so many other situations that one cannot but wonder whether
it might not be a basis of solution for the migratory divorce prob-
lem in the United States.
As an alternative, a sort of middle ground for a compromise
solution, to effect some measure of discouragement together
with greater uniformity, might be found in the vitalization of the
full faith and credit clause (as perhaps hinted at in the Rice case)
by (1) the establishment in a series of decisions of some general
standards for "bona fide domicile" and (2) placing the burden of
proof of this jurisdictional fact on the party invoking the foreign
decree.
There are of course those who assert that artificial rules and
principles cannot prevent or change the direction of development
of the inherent mores of the American people, and that the only
solution is in a restabilization of their social attitudes and family
institutions. There is no denying such optimum results, but in
their absence, it has always been a function of law to use re-
straints and curbs as molding influences and as a means of neces-
sarily guiding direction within certain limits.
In the absence of uniform state legislation (which is unthink-
able at the present time), and in the absence of appropriate fed-
eral legislation or constitutional amendment (which is virtually
impossible), and in view of the continuing national interest in the
increasing problems of migratory divorce, the only avenue-if any
-of making progress towards effectuating the desired policies,
is in the United States Supreme Court. This body is wrestling
with a mighty problem; perhaps a more constructive direction
will still emerge.
12. For description of a different situation in Australia, see Cowen, The
Recognition of Foreign Judgments under a Full Faith and Credit Clause
(1948) 2 Int. L. Q.21.
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